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Passage of the North-American  Free Trade Agreement  (NAFTA)  reawakened  fears that
multinationals  would flock to Mexico  to take advantage  of lax environmental  standards. This is the
so-called  pollution  haven hypothesis, which states  that environmental  regulations  will move polluting
activites  to poorer countries. Although  existing studies suggest little or no evidence  of industrial
relocation, arguments  over pollution havens persist.  Why?
One answer lies in the fact that the existing  literature is primarily based on anecdotes  and
scattered  case studies. Even the best studies, such as Leonard (1988), make no effort to assess
statistically  the relationship  between  the distribution  of US foreign  investment  and pollution intensity.
Most of these studies make no attempt  to control for other factors  which may play a role in
determining foreign investment,  such as large protected  markets. Many of the earlier studies
(Pearson, 1985 and 1987; Walter, 1982)  use evidence  from the 1970s  and early 1980s, when the flow
of foreign investment  to developing  countries  was not as high as it is today. One exception  is the
recent work by Grossman  and Krueger (1993), which focuses  on maquiladora  activity in Mexico. Yet
their research also serves to highlight the difficulty  in explaining  the pattern of US investment  abroad.
They show that neither pollution abatement  costs nor other likely determinants  can adequately  explain
the pattern of maquiladora  activity in Mexico.
Although  there is a growing literature  on the determinants  of global environmental  quality,
little research has been done to test the pollution haven  hypothesis. 2 Our research focuses on three
2  Instead,  much  of the literature  focuses  on the relationship  between  income  growth  and pollution. Grossman  and Krueger
(1995)  postulate  an inverted  'u-curve'.  This empirical  relationship  has found support  in other studies  as well (see Selden  and
Song, 1994; The World Bank, 1992). The hypothesis,  supported  by their empirical  analysis, states that pollution  will first
increase with income, then decrease at higher income levels.  The initial  upward relationship  occurs because of a positive
relationship  between  output  and emissions. The downward  tendency  occurs when  higher  demand  for environmental  quality  at
higher  irncome  levels forces the introduction  of cleaner  technologies  (the  technique  effect)  and an output  combination  which is
less polluting  (the composition  effect).
A related literature  examines  the relationship  between  openness  and environmental  quality. Again, the links can be
1related issues. We begin by presenting  a simple theoretical  model which shows that the effect of
environmental  regulations imposed  at home on outward  investment  is ambiguous.  Depending  on
possible complementarities  between  capital and pollution abatement,  environmental  regulation  could
lead to an increase  or a decline  in investment  in both the host (developing)  country and the originating
(developed)  country.
To resolve the theoretical  ambiguity,  we turn to an empirical analysis  of the pattern of foreign
investment. We begin by analyzing  the pattern of foreign  investment  in a number of developing
countries--looking  for evidence  which reflects increasing  costs of pollution-intensive  activities at
home.  To control for other factors which may be important  in helping to attract foreign investment,
we create measures  of trade policies, industrial concentration,  the domestic regulatory  environment,
factor endowments,  and wages at home. We use data from four host countries: Cote d'Ivoire,
Morocco, Mexico, and Venezuela.
Second, we compare the behavior of multinational  firms in developing  countries  with their
counterparts  in the host country. In particular,  we focus on the emissions  behavior of foreign and
domestic plants within the same manufacturing  sector. Since emissions  across a wide range of
decomposed  into an output-  a composition-  and technique  effect. In the case of trade reform, however,  the composition  effect
is of a different  nature, since  openness  to trade itself  changes  sectoral  composition.  A number  of empirical  studies  suggest  that
openness  reduces  pollution  (Wheeler  and Martin,  1992;  Birdsall  and Wheeler,  1992),  while  others claim  evidence  to the contrary
(Rock, 1995). Theoretical  models  have a different  flavor, with  results depending  on whether pollution  problems  are national
or transnational,  and on the assumed  regime  for environmental  management.  Copeland  and Taylor (1994)  present a model in
which pollution  problems are national  and national  pollution  control is optimal  in both countries. It is, thus, a model with no
coordination  problem,  emphasizing  comparative  advantage  as in a traditional  trade model.  Then, one effect  of openness  is that
the poor country  will  be offered  a higher  premium  for undertaking  polluting  activities,  the effect  that is  presumed  in the  pollution
haven hypothesis.  However, openness  will also leave both countries wealthier,  and thus more interested in changing  both
techniques  and composition  in the direction  of less pollution.
Concerns  along the lines of openness  and pollution  also touch on concerns  for competitiveness,  and the introduction
of measures  such as harmonization  of environmental  standards  in trade negotiations.  Kanbur, Keen and Wijnbergen  show that
coordination  of environmental  standards  may be justified to avoid damaging "environmental  competition",  but suggest that
(complete)  harmonization  would not be the preferred  way  of coordination.  Extending  such analysis  with a supranational  body
such as the European  Community,  Ulph (1995)  shows that information  asymmetries  between  the higher body and the nations
can lead to a greater harmonization  than one would see in the case with full information. Markussen, Morey and Olewiler
extend  the open-economy  analysis  to include  endogenous  market  structure.
2countries and activities are not available,  we use energy consumption  and the composition  of fuel
types as a proxy for emissions.  We present evidence  from the US to justify that fuel-and  energy-
intensity can be used as proxies for differences  in pollution intensities  within an industry.
Third, we test whether  the pattern of outbound  US investment  during the 1980s  and early
1990s  can be explained  by variations  in pollution abatement  costs across different sectors of the
economny.  If environmental  legislation  in the 1980s  led to higher costs of doing business in the
United States, then we would expect that foreign investment  leaving this country  would be
concentrated  in sectors where pollution  abatement  costs are significant.
Our focus is consequently  on two related issues: (1) the impact of pollution abatement  costs
on the composition  of foreign investment  and (2) the role played by foreign  investors in improving
the environment  by using more energy-efficient  technology  as well as cleaner  sources of energy.
Grossman  and Krueger (1993) label these two issues as a "composition"  and a "technique"  effect.
They show that NAFTA is likely to affect Mexico's environment  by changing  both the composition  of
output as well as the overall level of technology.
The remainder  of the paper is organized  as follows. Section II presents a simple modelling
framework, describes  the empirical specification,  and discusses  the data.  Section  III examines  the
factors which affect the stock of foreign  investment  in four developing  countries. Section IV presents
the methodology  for analyzing  the relative  pollution intensity  of foreign and domestic firms within an
industry, and then presents the results.  Section  V presents the analysis  of outbound  US investment.
Section VI concludes.
II.  A Modelling  Framework
In conventional  terms, a country has comparative  advantage  in an activity  which uses
3intensively  factors that the country has in relative  abundance.  Trade theory shows how all countries
gain if each exploits its comparative  advantage. The  pollution haven hypothesis  is, perhaps, best seen
as a corollary to the theory of comparative  advantage:  as pollution control costs begin to matter for
some industries in some countries, other countries  should gain comparative  advantage  in those
industries,  if pollution control costs are lower there (for whatever  reason).
The hypothesis raises several  contentious  issues, some of which are of an empirical nature,
while others have political and possibly  ethical connotations.  The empirical question  addressed in this
paper is whether relocation  of  pollution intensive industries  is of importance  quantitatively. Other
political and ethical issues about environmental  quality can hardly be of great importance  if the
migration  south of polluting industries  is not of significant  quantitative  importance.
In this section, we first present a simple  model with a homogeneous  good and perfect
competition.  We show that the impact of abatement  costs on industrial relocation  is ambiguous. For
example, if abatement  costs fall with the scale of output, then the home country  firm may find it more
advantageous  to expand  locally when facing tougher  environmental  regulations.  These results are
similar to those of Motta and Thisse (1994), showing  that delocation  is not an obvious outcome once
a model is equipped  with some realistic features.
We then introduce  the modelling  elements  required in an empirical  model with multiple
outputs; we need proxies for other factors  that attract foreign  investors, such as regulatory
environment,  market size and concentration.
11.1  A simplified  model 3
I The  material  in this section  is from the appendix  "Regulation  and foreign investment:  A more general model" (available
from the authors upon request).
4We shall first think of a market for a homogenous  good that is served by several types of
firms:  one type produces in country H (in which environmental  regulation  occurs), another produces
abroad (A), and finally some firms have production  facilities  in both countries. The market is
perfectly competitive,  implying that firms with different cost structures  adjust so that they have equal
marginal  costs.
Let the profits of a firm located  in country  H be:
(1)  7rH=pX  H-C  H (x  H, k  H,  a  H)  -rkH
where p denotes  the price of output,  x" denotes  the firms' sales, cH  is the firm's operating (i.e. non-
capital) costs, ke denotes  the firms's stock, r is the cost of capital, and a'  stands for pollution
abatement  - the resources needed  to meet the country's pollution regulations. c" is continuous,  twice
differentiable  and convex, so this will be the case for 1r  as well. We shall furthermore assume
that  aCŽ0,  aC￿0,




The meaning of these assumptions  are that short term marginal operating  costs are positive,
that capital reduces operating  costs, and that abatement  increases  operating  costs.
5Most of the insights from this model can be gleaned from figure 14. Short run marginal costs
(SRMC)  and average costs (AC) are drawn for the firm's present  level of capital. A demand
schedule  is not drawn, but we assume that there are many other firms in perfect competition  - at least
in the short term sense - so the individual  firm effectively  faces  infinitely  elastic demand. Since the
firm is in a short term equilibrium, it will be somewhere  on its short term marginal  cost curve,
SRMC. Furthermore, if the equilibrium  is one with zero excess  profits for the present level of capital,
then the firmn  will adjust to the point where average  costs (AC) are minimized, i.e. where the short
term marginal  cost curve cuts the average  cost curve from below. Finally, if the firm is in a long run
competitive  equilibrium, then also the firm's capital will minimize  average costs. We have alluded to
this possibility  by showing  the firm's equilibrium  output  for a given capital level: however, the
diagram does not show whether  this level of capital  minimizes  average costs. In the three dimensions,
however, the average cost surface would form a bowl, and a long run competitive  equilibrium  would
imply that the firm's output and capital would be where SRMC cuts this bowl from below at its
absolute  minimum.
Environmental  regulations  are a part of this picture. The parameter a'  represents  a shift
parameter  controlled  by the government.  Increasing  the required pollution abatement,  a", could
change  both the shape and position of the average cost curve (or, more precisely, the average cost
surface).  The only assumption  made a priori is that a'  shifts total operating costs upwards - which
also means that average costs shift upwards.
As the firm's average costs and total costs are not a part of its conditions  for optimality, the
firm might respond only passively  to a change in environmental  regulations.  If only average costs rise
(as if abatement increases  fixed costs only) the firm would spend the required resources on pollution
4  The  model is solved  by deducing the first-order  conditions  for  profit maximum with respect  to capital  and output,
differentiating these with respect to the regulatory parameter a 1 , and finally solving for the effect on investment and output




°  ~  ~~  ~  ~  t  'ar  /abatement,  but make no change  in its output and investment.  Its output could also change in the short
run, of course, if the price of output changed  (not shown) or if its marginal costs shifted  by e8. The
change  in the firm's output is ambiguous  if the short run marginal  cost curve also shifts upwards, and
if firm-specific  capital responds  to changes  in abatement.
To see what happens to the firm's investment,  we need to bring into consideration  that capital
in the outset may have been minimizing  average  costs, given the original abatement  requirement.  If
this is the case, then the firm's position  would be at the bottom of a bowl over the output-capital
plane. As a consequence  of increased  abatement  requirements,  we could see the bottom of the bowl
shifting outwards  or inwards -meaning that the firm would increase or decrease its output - and/ or to
the left or right - meaning that the firm could employ less or more capital.
Results for short term equilibrium  (meaning  that capital adjusts, but no condition of zero
profit has been included)  are displayed  below in equations  (2) and (3).
(  dp  a
2 cH  a  a2CH  02cH  a2CH
dxH  _  da H  axHaa H)  akH 2 ak Haa  H axHak  H
(2)  daH  a2cH  a2cH  a2CH  2
axH
2 ak  H
2
aX  Hak  H
and
- dp  _  2cH  )  a2cH  a2cH  a2CH
(3)  dk  H  da  H  ax  HaacH)  akHaXH  axH2  ak HaaH
da  H  a2CH  a2Ch  a
2 cH  2
axH2  ak  H2  axHak  H
7The denominator  in (2) and (3) is positive by the second-order  conditions  for profit
maximum,  and the effect on output is ambiguous. To obtain the effect generally  expected  in the




that there is no interaction  between  capital and abatement,
a) 2C H
ak  Haa  H0
and that abatement  increases  marginal  operating  costs
a 2c H
>0.
ax  Haa  H
Without these restrictive  assumptions,  however, a firm's output may increase simply because
its marginal  costs have increased  less than the output  price 5. Also, (2) shows us, output may
increase if there is an interaction  between  abatement  and output (one such case would be if abatement
makes more capital attractive  - as when capital intensive  technologies  are less polluting) and capital
5 We do not show the modelling  of the output  price, as it is awkward when there is heterogeneity  among firms (with
homogenous  firms, modelling  is shown in the appendix).  As is apparent  from equations  (2) and (3), ambiguouity  with respect
to sign remains  even if we assume that the output  price increases  by as much  as marginal  operating  costs are shifted upwards.
8reduces marginal  costs.
The effect of increasing  abatement  costs on capital  investment  is also ambiguous.  It is possible
that an increase in abatement  costs could raise investment  in the home country. One such possibility is
when capital lowers abatement  costs and marginal  operating  costs.  It is also possible to show in this
framework  that domestic investment  could rise even if output falls, if a sufficiently  large increase in
capital intensity is induced.
As an illustration  of these "complementarities",  assume  that a higher quality, more expensive
furnace is available  to a steel producer. It is more expensive,  has lower emissions  than the "normal"
model and is also more energy efficient,  so it will have lower variable  costs once it is installed.
Assume  further that at low levels of environmental  regulations,  the higher energy efficiency  is not
sufficient  to make the higher quality furnace attractive  to the firm.  Higher abatement  requirements
could make this cleaner technology  attractive  (increasing  investment,  and capital intensity in
production), and output might then expand as a consequence  of lower operating costs.  The
parameters  of the model will determine  whether  the firm keeps the old furnace  and pays higher
abatement  costs, invests in a new furnace and remains  at home, or moves to another location  and
shuts down the existing plant.
We do not show the results for firms based abroad, as these are rather intuitive. The
possibility  that output and investment  expands  abroad as a result of environmental  regulation  at home,
as supposed  in the pollution haven  hypothesis, exists. However, as it is also possible that firms in the
home country expand  both investments  and output, it is also possible that firms abroad reduce both
output and investment  - the opposite  of what is assumed  in the pollution  haven hypothesis.
We shall touch briefly on the possible existence  of integrated  firms, firms with production
9resources in both countries,  using them in an integrated  way to produce  the final output 6.
(4)  7r =px-c(x,  e,k 4,aa)-r(kH+k 4).
With integrated  firms, the situation is much more complex, since capital in the two locations
will be adjusted, and there are more types of interactions.  In the integrated  firm's cost function, the
possibility  exists that capital at home is complementary  to capital abroad, or that the two forms are
substitutable,  in addition to the possibilities  that capital is substitutable  to or complementary  to
abatement.
As an important  example,  consider  the case in which i) capital at home is complementary  to
abatement  (Then, ceteris paribus, abatement  requirement  makes  more capital at home attractive);
capital at home lowers short term marginal  costs (Then, ceteris paribus, more capital at home makes
higher production  at home more attractive)  and; iii) capital at home and abroad  is substitutable.  In this
case, we could see the firm investing  at home in order to make abatement  requirements  less expensive
to comply with, taking advantage  of the (thereby)  reduced  short term marginal  costs by increasing
output at home, and finally reducing capital  abroad due to the substitutability  of capital in the two
locations. Such a structure would, thus, lead to the opposite  effect of the pollution haven  effect in
both locations.
11.2  Elements  of an empirical  model
The simplified  model showed  how the effect of environmental  regulation  on the location  of
polluting industries  is ambiguous  even in a one-output,  simple theoretical  model. In our empirical
6 If a multinational  is modeled simply as the sum of the two previously  described profit functions,  then one implicitly
assumes  that  02c/8kHOkA=O,  0 2c/OkAdaH  = 0.  The  results  will be a blend of the results in the two previous  sections.  To  justify
this more general formulation,  think  of a firm producing  both  a final output  and intermediate  inputs in both countries  (for cars
that are assembled  and sold in both countries,  chassis are produced  abroad, engines  at home).
10testing, we need to exploit information  on investment  in industries  that are too broad to comprise
merely one homogenous  output. Also, we shall exploit variation across industries. Thus, the
modelling  framework  needs to be expanded  to include other  potential determinants  of foreign
investment.  In this subsection,  we lay out how such determinants  have been introduced in the
literature, and how they will be used in our subsequent  analysis.
Although  trade theories which predict the pattern of trade do not focus in general on
ownership, the same factors which have been used to explain trade have also been used to explain
foreign investment.  For example,  higher labor costs should increase a country's imports of labor
intensive  goods from a labor-rich country. This factor proportions explanation  for trade has also been
used to explain the pattern of foreign investment. Everything  else equal, we would expect that
foreign  investors would locate in countries  where factors they use in high proportions are cheaper
than at home. The importance  of factor proportions in explaining  the pattern of foreign investment
can be captured through such variables as skill intensity, capital-labor  ratios, and wage differentials
between countries.
It is clear, however, that factor  proportions alone yield an unsatisfactory  explanation  of
foreign  investment. The majority  of foreign investment  both originates  from and locates in industrial
countries. Thus, if intra-industry  trade and trade between  similar countries  is a challenge  to basic
trade theories, basic theories of foreign investment  face similar challenges. More recent theories
about foreign investment  focus on the role of ownership  itself. An important  role is played by
"intangible  assets" such as managerial  abilities, technologies and business  relationships.  It is essential
that the assets be  intangibly  related to the control of production;  otherwise  they could be sold at arms
length or rented so that the link to plant ownership  and control is severed.  For example, in
countries  where patent protection  is weak, research-intensive  goods might be sold via direct
investment  rather than via a licensing  agreement  with a local firm.  To capture the importance  of such
11intangibles  in guiding the foreign investment  decision, we will use the share of research and
development  expenditures  in value-added  whenever  such data is available.
A third factor which has been the focus of considerable  debate is the attraction of protected
domestic  markets, particularly  if they are large.  A large share of foreign investment  flows in the
early 1990s, for example, were targeted  either at the European Union in expectation  of EC92 or at
the US and Mexico in anticipation  of NAFTA. Much  of the early literature focuses on the fact that
DFI gravitates  towards  protected sectors. Helleiner  (1989), in his review of the role of foreign
investment  in developing  countries, points out that "the prospect  of large and especially  protected
local markets are the key to most import-substituting  manufacturing  firms' foreign activities".
Finally, recent studies of foreign investment  also focus on the role played by economies  of
scale and the concentration  amongst  firms within a sector. We will, as is done elsewhere  in the
literature, use variables such as the numbers of employees  per plant, or the Herfindahl  index, which
measures  the size distribution  of plants in a particular  sector.
III.  Foreign Investment and Pollution Abatement in Four Developing  Countries
The Approach: We to examine  the pattern of foreign investment  in four developing  countries:
Mexico, Morocco, Cote d'Ivoire and Venezuela. In Mexico  and Venezuela,  the majority of foreign
investment  originated  in the United  States; in Cote d'Ivoire and Morocco, most foreign investments
are of French origin.
For all four countries, the following  general specification  was adopted:
(10) DFI =  a,ABCOST + a2IMPENET  +  a3HERF + a4IMPENET*HERF  +
a5LAB/CAP + a6REGUL +a7MARKETSIZE  + u8WAGE
12The independent  variables, which vary by four-digit  sector, include  pollution abatement cost
(ABCOST);  import penetration  (IMPENET)  as a proxy for openness  in the sector's product market;
the Herfindahl  index (HERF), equal to the sum of the square of firm market shares in each sector, as
a measure  of scale and concentration;  the interaction  of market concentration  and import penetration
(IMPENET*HERF);  the labor-capital  ratio (LABCAP)  in the sector; a measure of regulatory  barriers
against DFI (REGUL)  which varies from 0 (no restrictions)  to 2 (foreign  investment  prohibited);  a
measure  of market size (MARKETSIZE),  which is defined  as the lagged share of domestic sales in
the sector  j  as a percentage  of total manufacturing  output and; wages in the sector  j  (WAGE)  in the
United States (for Mexico and Venezuela)  and France (for Morocco  and Cote d'Ivoire).
Data Issues. We focus on four developing  countries  which collect data on foreign ownership
in their manufacturing  censuses:  Cote d'Ivoire, Venezuela,  Morocco and Mexico. The time period
covered in the estimation  is slightly  different across the four countries. Cote d'Ivoire covers 1977
through 1987; Venezuela  covers 1983  through 1988; and Morocco  covers 1985 through 1990. In
Mexico, although we have a panel of plants from 1984  through 1990, ownership  information  was
only collected  in 1990. Data is reported at the plant level, and when sector level estimates  are
needed, these are obtained  by aggregating  over plant observations,  using a concordance  to four-digit
ISIC classification.  Foreign investment  is converted  to a share variable by dividing by the total
foreign investment  in that country and year.
In 1987, the share of foreign investment  in manufacturing  varied from 38 % in Cote d'Ivoire
to 7 percent in Venezuela. Morocco lies somewhere  in between: in 1988, foreign investrnent
accounted  for 15 % of total assets in manufacturing. In 1990, foreign investment  accounted  for 10
% of total assets in manufacturing  in Mexico. Since  these censuses  typically  only cover the largest
plants, our measure of DFI may be biased. The smaller plants and informal sector plants are
13excluded, so it is likely that the importance  of foreign investment  in the manufacturing  sector as a
whole may be over-stated. For Mexico,  the sample  excludes  many "maquiladora"  plants - firms
under special arrangements  to assemble  inputs imported  from the United  States for re-export.
The independent  variables vary across industrial  subsectors  and over time.  For all four
countries, all dependent and independent  variables  were redefined  to be consistent  with the ISIC
classification,  including  US abatement  costs.  Import  penetration,  the Herfindahl index (HERF), the
labor-capital  ratio (LABCAP),  and market size were calculated  using both the censuses and trade
information  from the source country. The measure  of regulations  against DFI (REGUL)  was taken
from both policy reports and various publications  for potential  investors. Manufacturing  wages by
sector and time period in France and the United States  were taken from ILO publications.
The data source for pollution abatement  expenditures  is the Manufacturers'  Pollution
Abatement  Capital Expenditures  and Operating  Costs Survey (referred to as the PACE survey)
administered  by the U.S. Department  of Commerce. Following  earlier studies, we defined pollution
abatemrrent  costs as the dollar amount of operating  expenditures  normalized  by industry value-added.
We feel  justified in excluding  capital expenditures  for several reasons. First, the majority of
abaterrient  expenditures  are for operating costs, not for capital expenditures. Second, the pattern of
costs across industries  is very similar across operating  and capital costs.  Data was available for 1976
through 1993, excluding 1987 when no survey  was conducted. Since  pollution abatement  costs were
not available  for France, we used the same abatement  cost measure, defined in Section II, in all four
host countries.  By using the same measure  of abatement  costs, we are assuming that abatement  costs
follow a similar pattern across sectors in the United States  and elsewhere.  This assumption  is
supported by Sorsa (1994), who finds that differences  in environmental  spending among  industrial
countries are minor. We also assume  that the pattern is a good proxy for the pattern of cost savings
associated  with localizing  production  in the host country. While the validity  of these two assumptions
14cannot be tested separately,  we will test the hypothesis  that he sectoral distribution  of foreign
investment  is positively associated  with high abatement  costs in the U.S., against the alternative
hypothesis  that there is a negative  or no association.
Results: The results are reported in Table 1.  In columns  (8) and (9), we pool all four
countries, but include country  dummies to allow for systematic  differences  across countries. For both
the pooled sample  and the individual  country results, we report the estimates  with and without dummy
variables for year and industry effects. For Mexico, however, the data is only available as a cross-
section for 1990. Consequently,  we cannot  control for time and industry effects.
Across all specifications,  for all four countries  and the pooled  data set, pollution abatement
costs are insignificant  in determining  the pattern of foreign investment. Thus, the data suggest no
robust association  between  the pattern of pollution abatement  costs and investment. Other factors,
however, significantly  affect the pattern of investment. For example,  the results show that import
penetration is negatively  related to DFI, suggesting  that foreign  investors locate in sectors with little
competition  from imports. The results also point to a negative  correlation  between  the Herfindahl
index and DFI, suggesting  that foreign investors  are less likely to locate in concentrated  sectors
typically  characterized  by entry barriers and economies  of scale.
In all four countries,  the single  biggest draw for foreign  investors was the size of the domestic
market.  Foreign investors tend to concentrate  in sectors with large total sales.  However, controlling
for market size could be unjustified  if the size reflects that domestic firms also invest in pollution-
intensive  activities--reflecting  a country's comparative  advantage  in producing "dirty" products.
Consequently,  the analysis  was redone  excluding  MARKETSIZE,  but the results were unaffected.
Using Measures of Pollution  Intensity: To test whether  the costs of environmental  regulations
lead firms to move plants abroad, this paper focuses  on the relationship  between  pollution abatement
costs and the pattern of foreign investment. An equally interesting,  but slightly different  question
15woulid  be to ask whether "dirtier" sectors--measured  using actual  pollution emissions--are  more likely
to attract foreign investors.7 We thus redid the analysis  using three different measures  of pollution
emissions:  total particulates, which is a measure  of air pollution; biological  oxygen  demand, which is
a broad measure of water pollution;  and total toxic releases. 8
Total particulates  (TP), which captures  small and large dust particles, is closely related to
phenomena  such as the (now historic) London smog, and to air pollution in cities with emissions  from
fuel- and diesel oil combustion,  from energy-intensive  processes  such as steel and cement, from two-
stroke engines, coal use, and burning of wood and residues. Analysis  in the World Bank and
elsewhere  indicates  that particulates  is the main air pollution  problem (as judged by health impact) in
many third world cities (See, for instance, World Bank 1992, Ostro 1994  and Ostro et al 1994).
Biological  Oxygen Demand  (BOD) indicates  how discharges  to water bodies deplete their oxygen
levels, and is widely accepted  as a broad measure  of water pollution. Total toxic releases (TOX) is
an unweighted  sum of releases of the 320 compounds  in the U.S. EPA's toxic chemical release
inventory. All of these measures  are by weight. In order to normalize,  emissions  are divided by the
total output of the firm,  measured in monetary terms, to arrive at sector-specific emission intensities
for thie  three pollutants.
Regretfully,  no comprehensive  data on manufacturing  emissions  exists for developing
countries. We assume  that the sector specific  emnission  intensities  estimated  from data on
manufacturing  in the United States  can serve as proxies for the relative emission  intensities  for the
same sectors within the LDC host countries. Sector specific  emissions  intensities  are calculated  using
6One  might conjecture  that industries  with  high abatement  costs  are industries  with high pollution  intensities,  but this
need not be the case, given that abatement  could be effective  in removing  pollution. If abatement  is socially  optimal,  then an
industry will be ranked high in terms of abatement  costs and low in terms of pollution  intensity if marginal  benefits  equal
marginal  costs at a point  with much abatement  and little remaining  pollution.
7See Hettige,  Martin, Singh and Wheeler, (1995)  for more details on the database.
16a plant-level  data set resulting from a merger of data sets of the Bureau of the Census and U.S.
EPA 9.
Such  "imnported"  emission intensities (for individual inputs, technologies,  or outputs, as
applied here) are routinely used in environmental  analysis  when local and more specific emission
measurements  are not available.'° It may certainly be argued that emission  intensities  are higher in
developing  countries, due to less progress  with emission  controls, older technologies  and lower skill
levels. The working hypothesis  is still plausible, however, that relative  emission intensities  among
sectors are similar across countries. It is certainly the case that industries  such as cement, industrial
chemicals,  fertilizer and pesticides,  pulp and paper, refineries and primary metals--which  have the
highest abatement  costs in the U.S--are same industries  where abatement  costs are high in other
industrialized  countries (See Sorsa, 1994). Briefly stated, we assume that these sectors in developing
countries  are also likely to be heavy polluters.
Table 2 reports the correlations  between  the three measures  of emission intensity and pollution
abatement  costs. The table shows that, in a comparison  among 4-digit ISIC sectors in the US, there is
no significant  correlation  between  air pollution, water pollution, and toxicity. Thus, although  these
three measures  of pollution are very broadly  defined, there is no general tendency  that a sector which
pollutes in one medium also pollutes another medium. However,  Table 3 does report a statistically
significant  correlation  between  abatement  costs and toxic releases. Industries  which on average have
high abatement  costs typically  also emnit  toxic substances.
Table 3 repeats the specification  in Table 1, but replaces  pollution abatement  costs, the
sThe  emissions  data  are from  three separate  data-bases  generated  by the  United  States  Environmental  Protection  Agency
(U.S. EPA): The Aerometric  Information  Retrieval  System  (Air), The National  Pollutant  Discharge  Elimination  System (water)
and the Toxic Chemical  Release  Inventory  (irrespective  of medium).  These  have been linked with the Longitudinal  Research
Data  Base on manufacturing  firms (Bureau  of the Census, Center  for Economic  Studies)  by a World  Bank research  project:  The
Industrial  Pollution  Projection  System  (IPPS), see Hettige, Martin, Singh  and Wheeler, 1995.
9Such  transferred  intensities  and coefficients  are used in engineering  analysis  as well as in more superficial  economic
analysis,  and in industrial  as well as developing  countries. See, for instance,  for engineering  analysis,  U.S.  EPA's AP-42, on
industrial  emission  coefficients  for air pollution.
17endogenous variable, with our three different measures of emission intensities.  We only report the
coefficients on the three measures of pollution emissions, since the coefficients on the other variables
are similar to those reported in Table  1, and not of primary  interest.  We report the results both with
and without industry and time dummies.  Since our emission intensity proxies do not change over
time (in contrast to pollution abatement costs,  which vary across industries and over time) the panel
estimates without industry dummies are most meaningful.
In general, the relationship  between emission measures and the pattern of foreign investment
is eitlher insignificant or negative--high levels of water pollution (proxied by BOD), for example,  are
associated with less foreign investment, not more.  The only exception is for air pollution:
SUSSPART is significantly and positively correlated with the pattern of foreign investment.  The
countiry-by-country results show that this is due to a relationship between SUSSPART and the pattern
of foreign investment in Morocco.  The positive association relationship between air pollution
emiss'ions and foreign investment in Morocco is driven by one observation:  a high concentration  of
foreign investment in the cement industry.  Yet it is arguably unlikely that French  investors flocked to
Morocco to take advantage of lax environmental standards in this particular industry,  since cement
exports back to France are essentially zero.  Instead, the cement industry is attractive to French
investors due to the fact that import competition is slim and there are few domestic competitors."
The positive  association between air pollution and foreign investment disappears in these models if the
Moroccan cement industry is excluded from the sample.
IV.  Eneruy  use and pollution  intensity:  proxies  for differencies  within  Industries
" Cement is a low-price, bulky commodity, with the result that transportation costs will be high as a share of the final price.
For this; reason  - as well as due to policy intervention - many countries are close to self-sufficient in cement.
18Our discussion  so far ignores one potential benefit from the entry of industrial country firms
into developing countries.  If industrial country plants use cleaner technology than their local peers,
they may help the host country environment.  This would be true if foreign entrants replace older,
"dirtier"  local competitors,  and even more so if they also influence domestic plants in their choice of
fuels or technology.
Unfortunately,  data on emissions by ownership is not currently available for our four sample
countries.  One way to address the problem is to find a proxy for emissions at the plant level.  In this
section,  we propose using fuel and energy intensity as a proxy for emissions at the plant level.  We
first make the case for these proxies using evidence from the U.S.
The relationship between energy use and air pollution assumed in most technical and
economic studies is not well defined. The standard reference in the technical literature on this topic is
EPA's  handbook AP-42, which prescribes emission factors for various  industrial processes
(combustion and others).  For most processes,  AP-42 proposes an emission function  (or a range,
given that a limited number of measurements have given widely varying results), as follows:
(1  1)
e  ej(x 1,x 2 ,  . . ,xn,aj,  tL),  = >  f1 j(aj,  tj)  xj.
where e, are emissions of pollutant i (say dust, in kilograms), xj is the quantity of fuel j  (say diesel
oil, in tons), aj is a variable denoting the type of abatement equipment in place,  if any (say, filters,
precipitators,  baghouses),  and tj is (a vector) denoting other relevant aspects of technology  and
equipment.  In our work we shall use energy intensity, defined as energy use per unit of output,  as a
proxy for emissions. We discuss the validity of this assumption below.
19Based on technically oriented source literature like the U.S.  Environmental Protection
Agency's  AP-42 (U.S.  EPA,  1986) and more basic texts, it has been customary to associate air
pollution with fuel use, and to assume proportionality  (as in the second equality of  11)12.  For some
pollutants,  such as CO 2 (the main contributor to global warming) and to a certain extent sulphur
emissions,  the proportionality  assumed in (11) between fuel use and emissions is quite accurate".
For other air pollutants,  however, the relationship is more dubious; measured coefficients may be
scattered,  and theory as well as experience suggests that coefficients are sensitive to equipment
specifications and operating conditions (as one can observe when behind buses and trucks).
From the point of view of economic modelling, it is important to be aware that (11) describes
a technical relationship, not an economic one. While (11) implies that the partial derivative of
emissions with respect to the use of fuel oil from  a technical perspective is a constant, this may not be
true from an economic perspective.  From an economic perspective,  it would be necessary to ask:
what is it that we imagine is changing, which in turn changes the use of fuel oil? For instance, if the
factory owner faced rising fuel oil prices, he might respond by renewing his boiler equipment,  in
which case both fuel oil consumption and his emission intensity would be reduced. In contrast,  if he
faced (leclining markets for his final products, he might reduce fuel consumption by  reducing daily
operat:ing  hours,  thus holding the emission intensity constant.
In our cross-section comparisons between firms,  several factors are worth mentioning.  First,
12 Notable studies are Jorgenson  and Wilcoxen (1993), Gloemsroed, S., T. Johnsen and H. Vennemoe (1992), Manne and
Richels (1990).
13 Two main "break points"  between energy intensity and emissions,  when the former is measured by energy cost shares,
and emissions,  is variations in fuel type,  and emission control devices.  The number of carbon atoms in the fuel is fixed,  and
carbon dioxide is the end product of the combustion process. The combustion process may not be complete, however,  to allow
a certain amount to be released as hydrocarbons,  carbon monoxide, or  in the form of particulates.  Similarly,  for sulphur,  the
number of atoms in the fuel is given. However, some of these may be trapped by emission control devices, or,  as in the cement
industry, in the end product of the process. There are polluting processes,  such as the cement industry, for which the majority
of the emissions  are not combustion residuals.  The cement industry is, however,  apart from extremely polluting,  extremely
energy  intensive. Moreover,  more modern plants will, irrespective of control devices, be both less polluting and more energy
efficient.
20it would be important  to distinguish  between  energy sources - which we will be able to do only for
some of the data sets. Thus, to the extent that firms in the same manufacturing  subsector  use different
fuels, our "emission  factor" is a weighted  average, at best" 4. Secondly,  we shall be unable to
observe some "other" differences  between  the firms that may lead to different levels of emissions,
such as abatement  equipment  or machinery  type.  However, we will be able to control for other
factors which may be important, such as capital intensity, imported  machinery,  research and
development,  the plant's age.
An important  determinant  of air pollutant  emissions, emission  control equipment,  is not
reflected  when energy is used as an indicator. However, even in industrialized  countries, emission
control equipment  first gains importance  for a low number of large "high-stack"  polluters, such as the
steel, cement and thermo-electric  power plants, leaving most firms untouched  for decades. We
conjecture  that in the less developed  countries of our study, air  pollution control equipment  will, at
best, be in place (and effective)  in a small fraction of manufacturing  firms.
We shall show, however, that even in the U.S., where respectable  air pollution control
programs have been in place for more than 20 years, and the choice of fuiels  and electricity  is very
varied, there is a strong statistical relationship  between  air pollution coefficients  and energy use.  We
may argue that due to the lower prevalence  of emission  control devices in developing  countries, and
the likely lower variation in fuel choice within an industry, the relationship  between air pollution and
energy use in these countries is likely to be even stronger".
14 Our data results from fuel and energy cost shares.  Thus, to the extent that firms in the same subsector use different fuels,
rather than different amounts, our estimates will be biased if and when fuel unit prices are correlated with emission factors. Unit
prices  for fuels are likely negatively correlated with emission factors, with "cleaner fuels" (gas, light fuel oils) typically more
expensive than dirtier (coal, heavy fuel oil). Our test is based on the assumption that there is a greater tendency that firms in
the same industry use the same,  or similar combinations of fuels.  Our results give some support for our methodology,  since
strong correlation between pollution and energy use is found, even when energy is measured in cost terms (this test is arguably,
a strong test, since  U.S. is a large country with big local variations in prices of natural gas and coal.
15 Guo and Tybout (1994), Moss and Tybout (1994) and Eskeland, Jimenez and Liu (1994) have studied fuel choice in Chile
and Indonesia, data bases in which details on fuel choice is available, but ownership  data is not.
21We begin by presenting  the evidence  on the relationship  between  energy use and pollution
emissions  across U.S. industries. As in the earlier tables, we use three different  measures of
emissions:  particulates, which measure air pollution;  BOD, which measures  water pollution; and
toxics.  As before, particulates  are defined  as annual pounds  of particulates  divided  by thousands  of
dollars of total output in the sector. BOD intensity is defined as daily kilograms  per thousands  of
dollars of output. Two different  measures  of toxics are reported, TOXLB  and TOXUB.  Both
measures  are computed  as annual  pounds of toxics divided  by total output in thousands  of dollars.
TOXLB ("lower bound"), however, is computed  using total toxics reported by the Toxic Release
Inventory  (TRI), divided  by total output in the sector. While TOXUB  ("upper bound") is computed
using only those plants present in both the TRI database  and the LRD database.
The rank correlations  between these alternative  measures  of emissions  and different factor
inputs, including  energy, are reported in Table 4.  We report the correlations  between  emissions  and
six different factor inputs: the share of unskilled  labor in total value of shipments,  the skilled labor
share, capital share, manufactured  input shares, raw material input shares, and the share of energy
inputs in total output. Energy use is highly correlated  with different measures  of emissions. The
correlation between  energy use and particulates  is .58; between  toxics  and energy  use the correlation
varies between .52 and .55.  The correlation  with BOD is lower, though also significantly  different
from zero, at .22.  Table 4 also shows that the correlation  between  pollution and energy use is much
higher than for other factor inputs.
In Table 5, we use OLS to estimate  the relationship  between  energy intensity and emissions
after controlling  for other factor inputs.  For particulates,  energy intensity is the only input which is
statistically  significant  in explaining  emissions. However, neither energy nor any other factor input is
a good indicator  of BOD, which measures  water pollution. Finally, the results in columns 3 and 4
indicate  that while energy is significantly  correlated  with toxics after controlling  for other factors,
22both capital and raw material inputs are also correlated  with toxic emissions.
The results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest  that energy intensity, measured  as the share of energy
inputs in total output, is highly  correlated with the suggested  measures  of emissions. In a cross-
section of industries, energy intensity is significantly  correlated  with air pollution and toxic emissions,
but not with water pollution. In addition, energy intensity  is more highly correlated  with air pollution
than other inputs, such as capital or raw materials.
Yet even if energy intensity could  provide a good proxy for emissions across industries,
energy intensity may not be a good proxy for differences  in emissions  between  plants within the same
industry. To investigate  this issue, we used a cross section  of U.S. manufacturing  firms to examine
the relationship  between  different types of factor inputs and plant-specific  emissions, one industry at a
time.  The results are reported in Table 6.  The strength  of the relationship  between  energy use and
emissions  varies with the type of industry. In a cross section  of all firms, including  SIC sector
dummies, energy intensity is a strong predictor of particulates  emission.  However, when the
relationship  is estimated in a separate equation  for each of the 17 SIC industries, emissions  of
particulates  are highly correlated  with energy  use at the plant level for only four industries:
chemicals,  petroleum refining, lumber and wood products, and non-electrical  machinery. Two of the
most polluting activities  in manufacturing--chemicals  and petroleum  refining--are  included in these
four sectors.
We have argued that energy  use, from a technical  perspective,  might be a useful proxy for
emission  intensity between  as well as within industries. The results presented  in Tables 4, 5 and 6
suggest that energy intensity is highly correlated  with particulates  emissions, although  that relationship
is only significant  at the intra-industry  level for four industries. It should be emphasized  that such an
association  is likely to vary over time.  However, until actual  emissions data by ownership  type at the
plant level become available,  this approach  can be justified on the basis of evidence  from US plants.
23We thuls  turn to an analysis  of foreign direct investment  and energy intensity  in developing  countries
building on these findings.
Table 7 presents evidence  on the determinants  of energy intensity  at the plant level.  In this
estimation, we include only plants in the chemical, petroleum  refining, wood and lumber, and non-
electrical machinery  sectors, since  these were the sectors for which the proxy was significant  when
comparing  plants within sectors in the U.S. data sets. Independent variables include ownership,  plant
size, capital intensity, age of the plant, machinery  imports, research and development,  and the
electricity  price.  Morocco  is excluded from the analysis  due to lack of information  on plant-specific
energy use. Since data availability  varies across the three data sets, not all variables could be included
for each country. The data from all four sectors are pooled, and all estimates  include sector dummies
at the iour-digit SIC level.
Table 7 reports results on two separate  tests.  First, we measured  the determinants  of energy
intensity, defined  as the share of energy inputs in total output (in value terms) for each plant.
Second, we examined  the extent to which ownership  affects the use of cleaner types of energy--in
particular, electricity  and natural gas.
The negative  and statistically  significant  coefficient  on foreign ownership  (see equation (1) of
Table 7 for each country)  shows that foreign ownership  is associated  with lower levels of energy  use
in all the three countries in our sample. To the extent that energy  use is a good proxy for air
pollution emissions, this suggests  that foreign-owned  plants have lower levels of emissions than
comparable domestically  owned plants. The results are robust to the inclusion  of plant age as well as
capital intensity--suggesting  that foreign  plants are more fuel efficient  even if we control for the fact
that foreign  plants tend to be younger and more capital-intensive.
We also test (see column  (2) for both Mexico and Venezuela)  whether  foreign ownership  is
associaited  with using "cleaner"  types of energy. For Mexico, we test whether foreign firms have a
24higher share of electricity in their energy  bill.  In Venezuela,  we test whether foreign firms have a
higher share of electricity  and natural gas in their total energy  bill.  For both countries, we find that
foreign ownership  is associated  with the "cleaner  end" of the range of energy types."f
V.  The Impact of Pollution Abatement Costs on US Outbound  Foreign  Investment
A potential  problem of the preceeding  analysis  is its inability  to distinguish  foreign direct
investment  by country of origin. We are forced to assume that most DFI originates in industrialized
countries, and that the distribution  of abatement  costs in industrialized  countries is similar to the
pattern in the United States. Although  both assumptions  are plausible, in this section we address
these problems  by examining foreign investment  originating  in the United States.
If environmental  legislation  has led to higher costs of doing business in the United States, then
we would expect that foreign investment  leaving  this country  would be concentrated  in sectors where
pollution  abatement  costs are high.  One simple  way to test this hypothesis  is to measure the statistical
correlation between  the pattern of outbound foreign investment  and pollution abatement  costs across
different  sectors.  In the United States, the Department of Conmnerce gathers information on both the
stock and flow of outgoing  foreign investment,  and publishes  the data at the level of three-digit  SIC
sector codes. 17 For the manufacturing  sector, the PACE survey described  earlier was used as a
source for pollution abatement  expenditures.
Foreign investment  outflows  were available for 1982 through 1994, recorded on a historical
cost basis. As earlier, to normalize  the foreign investment  data, we divided investment  for each three
"At the point  where it is used, electricity  is a "clean"  fuel, though  it may be more  or less polluting  than others where it is
produced (See Eskeland,  Jimenez  and Liu, 1994).  Natural  gas is a "clean" fuel by all standards.
17. The  time  series data  on outbound  U.S. DFI is not  reported  by recipient  country. Thus, a detected  pattern  on this data  would
have to reflect  a general  tendency  for DFI to locate  in countries  with  less abatement  costs, since  one cannot  distinguish  recipient
countries.
25digit sector by the year's total for foreign investment. Consequently  our foreign investment  data
measures  the distribution of direct foreign investment  (DEI)  across subsectors. We also redid the
analysis  using other measures  of foreign  investment,  such as foreign investment  income and sales.
However, since  using these alternative  measures  did not affect our results, they are not reported in the
paper.
Although both DFI and abatement  costs are recorded  using the same Standard  Industrial
Classification  (SIC), SIC codes were revised  in 1987. New codes were added and others were
deleted, making it difficult  to create an unbroken  time series for the whole period.  We addressed  this
problem by deleting  SIC codes where the change  in classification  creates a time series which is not
comparable  before and after 1987. This led to the elimination  of about 30 percent of the SIC codes
with available data.
Using data for the 1982-1994  period, we estimated  the strength  of the relationship  between
the pattern of foreign investment  and pollution  abatement  costs in several different  ways. The results
are reported in Table 8.  We began by regressing  annual foreign investment  outflows  on pollution
abatemrent  costs, without controlling  for other factors. Pollution  abatement  costs were measured, as
before,,  as the sectoral share of abatement  costs in manufacturing  value-added.
As indicated  in Table 8, there is a statistically  significant  correlation  between abatement  costs
and the pattern of foreign investment  if no control variables are included. The results are similar if
foreign investment  is measured  as a flow (column  (1)) or as a stock (column  (4)).  The magnitudes,
however, are small.  If abatement  costs doubled from a mean of 1.3 percent of value-added,  the
distribution  of outbound DFI would move towards dirtier industries  by 0.2 to one half of 1 percent.
For a subset of the period, we were able to include other variables which also affect the
pattern of foreign investment. To capture the role of factor endowments,  we included measures  of
human  capital and physical capital. Human capital is measured  as the lagged share of skilled labor in
26value added. Physical  capital is measured  as the lagged share of capital in value added.  Research
and development  expenditures,  as a share of value added (RNDSHARE)  capture the importance  of
intangible  assets in motivating  foreign  investment. Scale economies  are proxied by the number of
employees  per firm (SCALE).
Without more detail on the destination  of foreign  investment,  it is difficult to formulate
measures of protection  in destination  markets. However, to the extent that markets are in general
open towards  US products in a particular  category of manufacturing,  one good measure would be
outbound exports from the United States. If foreign  investment  is attracted to protected  markets, we
would then expect a negative  relationship  between  US exports and the pattern of outbound  foreign
investment. Export volumes may also reflect other factors, such as transport costs and U.S.
comparative  advantage. If transport costs are large enough to encourage  foreign investment  and
discourage  exports, this would also be reflected  in a negative  coefficient  on export shares.  Exports
(lagged)  are measured  as the share of export sales in total U.S. output.
If we introduce these additional  variables, the relationship  between  abatement  expenditures
and the pattern of outbound  US investment  becomes  insignificant  if DFI is measured  as a flow.
However, the relationship  between  the stock of foreign investment  and pollution abatement  costs
remains significant. As predicted  by theory, foreign investment  outflows  are significantly  and
positively  correlated with research and development  expenditures,  but SCALE has no impact.
Foreign investment  outflows  are negatively  associated  with export shares and positively associated
with the share of physical capital in value added.
Adding time and industry dummies  further reduces  the statistical significance  of the abatement
cost variable, which then becomes  insignificant  for both definitions  of DFI.  This result, then,
indicates  that sector-specific  changes  in abatement  cost are not significantly  associated  with outbound
U.S. DFI.  Some other variables, however, retain their significance  in explaining  the pattern of
27foreign investment. The flow of DFI is again negatively  correlated  with exports, suggesting  that
outbound  foreign investment  is a substitute  for exports. The stock of foreign  investment  is
significantly  and positively correlated  with RNDSHARE. In general, however, adding  time and
industry dumnmies  reduces  the statistical  significance  of all the variables. In part, this may be because
there is not sufficient  sector-specific  time variation  in the panel when other controls are added.
Adding controls  reduces the number  of years available  to only five.  One future area for research
would be to create longer time series for trade variables, which are only available for a more limited
time period due to changes  in the way trade is classified.
The results in Table 8 suggest that there is no robust relationship  between the magnitude  of
expenditures  on pollution abatement  and the volume of US investment  which goes abroad. In
addition, the point estimates  suggest  that any impact  of abatement  costs on the distribution of DFI is
very smnall,  if not zero.  These results are not surprising  in light of the fact that pollution abatement
expenditures  are only a tiny fraction of overall costs.  In 1988, for example, the industry with the
highest  expenditures  on pollution abatement  (as a share of value-added)  was the cement industry. Yet
even in the cement industry, pollution  abatement  costs accounted  for only 3.2 percent of value-added.
This evidence  appears to confirm the conclusions  reached by earlier studies such as Walter (1982),
who argued that other factors  (such as market size or political risk) were simply more important  in
determining  industrial relocation.
VI.  Concluding  Remarks
This paper presents new evidence  on whether  multinationals  are flocking  to developing
country "pollution  havens" to take advantage  of lax environmental  standards. We begin by exanmining
the pattern of foreign investment  in four developing  countries: Mexico,  Venezuela,  Morocco and Cote
28d'Ivoire.  This approach  allows us to control for country-specific  factors which could affect the
pattern of foreign investment. We  find no evidence  that foreign investment  in these developing
countries  is related to abatement  costs in industrialized  countries. Furthermore, we find almost no
evidence  that foreign investors are concentrated  in "dirty" sectors.  The only exception  is Morocco,
where the tendency is caused  by one observation:  the heavy  concentration  of foreign investment  in the
cement industry.
We proceed to test whether, within industries,  there is any tendency for foreign  firms to
pollute less or more than their peers. Our proxy for pollution intensity is the use of energy and 'dirty
fuels', and we find that foreign  plants are significantly  more energy  efficient  and use cleaner types of
energy.
We then turn to an analysis  of the 'originating  country' by examining  the pattern of outbound
US investment  between 1982 and 1994. We reject the possibility  that the pattern of US foreign
investment  is skewed towards industries  with high costs of pollution abatement.
Our theoretical  model indicates  that the pollution  haven hypothesis  is unambiguous  only in a
very simplistic  model of the multinational  firm. In a more realistic  model the effect of regulation  on
foreign  investment  could be either positive  or negative,  depending  on complementarities  between
abatement  and capital. For example,  if abatement  costs fall with the scale of output, then the home
country firm may find it more advantageous  to expand  locally when facing tougher environmental
regulations. Thus, our finding of no significant  correlation  between  environmental  regulation  in
industrialized  countries and foreign investment  in developing  countries need not reflect that relocation
due to environmental  regulation  is 'too small' to be noticed in the data set.  The relationship  between
investment  and regulation  is not as simple  as assumed in a naive model. It depends on a number of
factors, the combined  effects of which may be positive, zero or negative.
In a variety of empirical tests, we have found almost no evidence  of pollution havens.
Instead, we find that foreign firms are less polluting than their peers in developing  countries. This
29does not in any way mean that 'pollution havens' cannot exist, or that we should cease to worry about
pollution in developing  countries. Our research does lend some support  to the view traditional in
public finance, however, that in both industrial and less developed  countries,  policy makers can
pursue pollution control policy focusing  on pollution itself, rather than on investment  or particular
invest:ors.
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33Table 1:  I'anel Regressions for DFI and Pollution Abatement Costs
Cote d'lvoire  Morocco  Venezuela  Mexico  Pooled Sample'
-__________  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Herfindahl  -0.65  -0.03  -7.81  -3.32  -11.75  -8.25  -4.71  -3.22  -2.87
Index  (0.4)  (0.0)  (2.3)  (0.8)  (2.8)  (1.8)  (0.6)  (2.0)  (1.7)
(Hindex)
hnport  0.41  0.16  -2.95  -2.84  0.91  -3.17  0.63  -0.85  -1.36
Penetration  (0.5)  (0.1)  (3.6)  (2.5)  (0.9)  (2.1)  (0.3)  (1.7)  (2.0)
(MPEN)
Hindex*MPE  -0.98  -1.22  -2.20  -7.50  10.3  3.76  -7.86  2.11  2.06
N  (.4)  (0.4)  (0.2)  (0.4)  (1.7)  (0.6)  (0.3)  (0.8)  (0.8)
Regulatory  - - -0.55  0.45  2.03  2.09  1.1  -0.54  -0.25
Barries  (1.2)  (0.7)  (2.0)  (1.3)  (1.2)  (1.4)  (0.6)
Against DFI[
Labor/Capital  -0.03  -0.04  0.00  0.06  -0.84  0.29  1.80  -0.07  -0.05
Ratio  (1.4)  (1.4)  (0.0)  (0.3)  (1.6)  (0.4)  (0.6)  (1.7)  (1.1)
Market Size  77.07  70.73  9.61  16.27  70.35  73.20  47.44  59.38  60.58
(16.6)  (15.0)  (0.9)  (1.5)  (4.6)  (4.7)  (3.2)  (111)  (10.9)
Source Wage  -0.02  -0.02  -0.16  0.26  -0.02  0.01  0.32  -0.04  -0.06
(.7)  (.1)  (2.0)  (1.6)  (0.5)  (0.03)  (0.2)  (1.4)  (1.4)
Pollution  7.24  8.95  5.04  -5.20  -18.53  -29.76  23.27  -1.04  -3.04
Abatement  (1.5)  (0.3)  (0.3)  (0.1)  (1.3)  (0.3)  (1.2)  (0.2)  (0.1)
Costs
Year and  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes
Industry
Dummies
N  210  210  145  145  203  203  44  558  558
Adjusted R-  .76  .79  .15  .18  .22  .35  .33  .29  .31
Square
Note:  T-statistics given in parenthesis.  Dependent variable is the share of aggregate foreign investment in a
given year assigned to each individual industry.
Includes country  dummy variables.
34Table 2: Correlations  Between  Pollution  Emission  Intensities
and Abatement  Costs
Suspended  Particles  Biological  Oxygen  Total Toxic
(SUSSPART)  Demand  (BOD)  Releases
(TOX)
BOD  -0.08
TOX  0.03  -0.10
Pollution  0.12  -0.13*  0.80*
Abatement
Costs
Note: A  "'"  indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
35Table 3:  Cross-Section  Time-Series  Regressions  for DFI with Alternative  Measures  of
Pollution  Emissions
(Coefficients  on Emissions  Only)
Cote  D'Ivoire  Morocco  Venezuela  Mexico  Pooled  Sample
0.060  -7.814  0.158  0.366  0.014  0.841  0.015  0.085  0.364
SUSSPART  (1.5)  (-1.8)  (4.6)  (0.5)  (0.5)  (0.8)  (0.3)  (2.6)  (1.0)
-0.002  0.019  0.001  -0.002  -0.003  -0.001  -0.004  -0.002  -0.001
BOD  (-2.2)  (0.2)  (0.6)  (0.5)  (-1.6)  (0.3)  (-1.0)  (-2.5)  (0.5)
0.009  0.016  -0.028  -0.019  -0.028  0.008  0.025  -0.013  0.004
TOX  (I.1)  (0.5)  (-1.4)  (-0.4)  (-1.4)  (0.2)  (0.6)  (-1.8)  (0.3)
Year and  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes
Industry
Dummy  ___  =  =  _  _
Notes: T-statistics  in parenthesis. Dependent  variable is the share of foreign investment  in a particular
ISIC category. See Table 2 for full specification. The specification  above reproduces  the specification
in Table 2, but replaces  pollution  abatement  costs with three different measures  of pollution  emissions.
36Table 4:  The Relationship  Between Energy Intensity and Pollution  Emissions  Across Industries:  Rank
Correlation  Coefficients
Raw
Unskilled  Skilled  Manufaactured  Material
Particulates  BOD  TOXLB  TOXUB  Labor  Labor  Capital  Inputs  Inputs  Energy
Particulates  1.00
BOD  0.29'  1.00
TOXLB  0.27'  0.17'  1.00
TOXUB  0.30'  0.19'  0.73'  1.00
Unskilled Labor  -0.15'  -0.16'  -0.16'  0.10'  1.00
Skilled Labor  -0.25'  -0.35'  0.01  0.05  0.36'  1.00
Capital  0.28-  0.09  0.36'  0.38'  0.01  0.48'  1.00
Manufactured Inputs  -0.19'  -0.13'  -0.00  0.06  -0.01  -0.20'  -0.33'  1.00
Raw Material Inputs  0.44'  0.34'  0.26'  0.17'  -0.33'  -0.42'  0.06  -0.24'  1.00
Energy  0.58'  0.22'  0.55'  0.52'  0.04  0.04  0.62'  -0.19'  0.34'  1.00
A "*" indicates statistical significance  at the 5 percent level.
37Table 5: Relationship Between Energy Intensity and Pollution Emissions Across Industries:
Regression  Coefficients
Dependent Variable:
Particulates  BOD  TOXLB  TOXUB
Energy  1.80'  0.04  1.72-  2.27'
(.26)  (.79)  (.37)  (.77)
Labor  -0.05  -0.04  -0.27  -0.06
(.09)  (.05)  (.12)  (.25)
Capital  -0.23  -0.64  3.49  4.85
(.72)  (.40)  (.95)  (1.98)
Manufactured  6.69  -5.36  6.06  32.55
Inputs  (6.46)  (3.77)  (8.61)  (17.98)
Raw Material  3.16  -5.91  28.43*  56.23'
Inputs  (7.74)  (4.36)  (10.79)  (22.55)
N  318  266  459  459
R-Square  .22  .02  .24  .10
Standard errors in ().  A  *"  indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
38Table 6: Energy Intensity as a Determinant of Emission Intensity at the Plant Level, US Data
All Plants  All Plants  Lumber and  Chemicals and  Petroleum  Non-Electrical
(1)  (2)  Wood  Allied  Refining and  Machinery (6)
Products  Products  Related
(Except  (4)  Products
Furniture)  (5)
(3)
Energy  1880  1859  774  2195  1349  3626
Intensity  (29.4)  (29.0)  (3.1)  (33.8)  (3.0)  (2.0)
Material  72  --  -2  112  -72  45
Inputs  (2.5)  (-0.0)  (1.2)  (1.0)  (0.3)
SIC  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No
Dummies
N  892  893  25  110  67  43
R-Square  .50  .50  .30  .91  .17  .09
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis.  All observations are by firm, for one year only.  Columns (1) and (2)
include all firms in 17 industries.  Columns (3) through (6) are the four industries among 17 SIC industries
for which a specification with energy and materials as independent  variables yields a significant coefficient
for energy.
39Table 7: Determinants of Energy Intensity in Selected Manufacturing Sectors:
Cote d'Ivoire,  Mexico, and Venezuela
Cote  Mexico  Venezuela
d'Ivoire
(1)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (3)
Foreign  -0.01 10*  -0.0033*  0,0496**  -0.0098*  0.2366*  0.0527*
Ownership  (.0039)  (.0005)  (.0096)  (.0015)  (0.0622)  (.0148)
Public  0.0019  - - - -
Ownership  (.0128)
Plant Size  -0.0072*  -0.0001  0.0090  -0.0008  0.1721*  -0.1268*
('000 of  (.0029)  (.0003)  (.0055)  (.0013)  (.0476)
Employees)
Capital  0.0167*  0.0026*  0.0288*  0.0127*  0.0056  0.0527*
Intensity  (.0030)  (.0002)  (.0040)  (.0002)  (.0080)  (.0129)
Age  0.0002*  - - 0.00002*  0.0009  -0.0102*
(.0001)  (.00001)  (.0010)  (.0023)
Machiinery  - -0.0003  0.0014  - -
Imports  (.0003)  (.006)
R and D  - -0.0090  0.2606  0.3716*  -0.6099  -.0638
Intensity  (.0102)  (.1864)  (.0143)  (.6997)  (.1461)
Electricity  - -0.0002*  -0.0008  0.0004*  - 0.0013*
Price  (.0000)  (.0007)  (.0000)  (.0004)
R-Square  0.24  0.14  0.14  0.18  .15  0.11
N  918  5,015  4,998  23,749  1,462  23,116
Notes:
In coluimn  (1), dependent variable is energy share in output
In column (2), the dependent variable is the electricity share in the plant's  total energy use
In column (3), the dependent variable is the share of natural gas in total energy use
All models include sector dummy variables (4-digit SIC).
Standard errors are given in parentheses.  A * indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent  level.
40Table 8:  The distribution of US Outbound Foreign Investment and
Pollution Abatement Costs
Distribution of Foreign  Distribution of Foreign
Investment  Investment
(FLOW)  (STOCK)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Pollution Abatement Costs  0.224  0.170  0.423  0.450  0.368  0.029
(2.3)  (1.3)  (0.5)  (4.5)  (3.5)  (0.3)
Human Capital Share  -0.060  0.163  - -0.166  -0.010
in Value-Added (Lag)  (-0.7)  (.3)  (-2.6)  (-0.2)
Physical Capital Share in  0.057  0.400  - -0.002  0.024
Value-Added (Lag)  (1.9)  (1.7)  (-0.1)  (1.0)
Export Share (Lag)  -0.085  -0.628  - 0.048  0.013
(2.5)  (2.6)  (1.8)  (0.5)
RNDSHARE (Lag)  .436  0.631  - 0.498  0.247
(3.6)  (0.5)  (5.3)  (2.0)
SCALE (Number of  -0.003  0.335  0.007  0.026
employees per plant)  (-0.1)  (1.5)  (0.3)  (1.2)
Year and SIC Dummies  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes
N  392  154  154  197  149  149
R-Square  .01  .18  .20  .09  .30  .99
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis.
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